What is the Problem of the Other?
In previous posts, we took a look at theories of Intersubjectivity that assumed a cooperative and harmonious relation to the Other as a norm. This week, we turn to conflictual theories of Intersubjectivity: Whether it be the other who threatens our status as original consciousness in Hegel; the anonymous others amongst whom we find ourselves thrown as per Heidegger; the Other who robs us of our freedom and autonomy, reducing us to objects, as in Sartre's existentialism; or the face to face encounter with an Other who calls us to an ethics of responsibility, below is an overview of the story of the Other who troubles philosophy.
Hegel (1770–1831): The Self and its Other, Master and Slave
According to Hegel’s story about the evolution of spirit or mind, consciousness becomes self-consciousness in the confrontation between one consciousness and another. Both seeking recognition as the true, original, and authentic consciousness, a duel onto death takes place. The result is an asymmetrical relation of difference where one consciousness chooses freedom over life and becomes the master of the slave consciousness that chooses life over freedom.
Through negation, the slave is turned into the Master's Other, a projective surface for the Master's needs and desires. But the revelation of Hegel's Master/Slave dialectic is that the dialectic is carried forward not by the Master, but on the side of the Slave who must come to consciousness as independent being through the fruits of his labor.
Martin Heidegger (1889-1976): Mitsein and "the They"
For Heidegger, anonymous others comprise Dasein's original state of being-with (Mitsein). These anonymous others are referred to collectively as "the They," a mass of humanity with whom we are thrown into the world. Dasein is a part of the being-with amongst "the They," from whom Dasein does not distinguish itself, for the most part. Even setting itself apart from these others is an experience common to "the They" - we all long to be recognized for being special and unique individuals.
So how does Dasein transcend “the They” and come into what existentialists call authenticity? only in taking on its own being-toward-death does Dasein catch a glimpse of transcendence, lifting itself out of "the They." We’ll take a closer look at the sections where Heidegger speaks about being-with or Mitsein, but lets continue in summary form to look at Sartre’s take on the Other.
Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1956): "Hell Is Other People"
In Part III of Being and Nothingness entitled “The Look,” Sartre denies a basic assumption of Hegel’s - that I can apprehend and absorb how the other sees me as an object. As he writes:
“I am incapable of apprehending for myself the self which I am for the other, just as I am incapable of apprehending on the basis of the other-as-object which appears to me, what the Other is for himself” (Being and Nothingness 327).
The self here cannot fully comprehend the Other, and the mirror that the other provides is not transparent. The Other is not a passive or inert mirror, but blurs and distorts our own self-understanding. The other modifies my own sense of self, against me and inspite of me, denies me control of my own self-understanding.
The Other undercuts the subject’s freedom and self-determination. To recognize the other as such is to see oneself through an alien and alienating mirror that we want to counter and negate. Thus, the essence of the subject’s relation to the Other is conflict, and any encounter with alterity is, by necessity, alienating. As he puts it in his play No Exit, "Hell is other people."
Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995): The Face to Face Encounter With The Other
Levinas’ thinking on intersubjectivity and the Other begins from the rejection of previous models that don’t seem to allow for an authentic encounter with true alterity, the otherness of the Other. For him, the Other is not there to be known (and the Other resists our attempts to comprehend), a rejection of the epistemological framework of his predecessors.
Instead, Levinas names Ethics as emerging from an encounter with the Other. A face to face encounter with an Other, described in phenomenological terms, inaugurates language and thought; and therefore, this encounter is a condition for the possibility for knowledge of any kind. Finally, this encounter calls one out and makes one responsible for the Other, a responsibility that cannot be done away with -- that is, it is irreducible.
This week's thinkPhilosophy podcast episode was on "The Provocations of Existentialism," wherein we returned to Sartre's existentialist ideas and brought Sartre's ideas into contact with those of previous thinkers with whom we have engaged - namely Beauvoir and Appiah. This blog post is a written meditation on this podcast session, but before we get started, an apology:
After I posted the podcast session I realized that it was not only too long, but that I did engage in some rambling, so I went back and cut a tangential discussion on Kant and some other random parts. I wanted to shorten and make the main issues clearer. Unfortunately, I accidentally left in one mention of Kant that will seem rather random to listeners - please ignore this mention of Kant, and carry on!
Okay, now to the matter at hand: Why is Existentialism provocative?
In "Existentialism Is A Humanism," Sartre is most obviously provoking the religious (Catholic) French majority, including theist Existentialists, by repeatedly asserting Atheism at the heart of his Existentialism. Second, he is also provoking humanists not only by making a claim to being a humanist, but by redefining what lies at the heart of humanism - the belief in a common, underlying human nature as the basis for moral judgement. For Sartre, there is no such human nature that can be assumed, but any such agreement or commonality is an achievement of mankind and history. No doubt, Sartre's essay does continue to aggravate theists on the right and secular, liberal humanists.
But Sartre's Existentialism is and should be personally provocative to each and every one of us. How is this? Recall that the basic tenet of existentialism is that "existence precedes essence" and how this is explained: we are compelled to make choices in a situation where we cannot know the outcome or consequences in advance, and in making choices and acting in the world (or even if we do not!), we are not only choosing for ourselves, but for all of humanity.
It is at this point that existentialism should begin to make us uncomfortable. In a world where we have been taught to resolve our differences by saying "you have your way and i have mine, and we can simply agree to disagree," Sartre is peace wrecker. In choosing our ways and acting as we see fit, we foreclose other possibilities that are available to us, and in doing this we are judging between options as to what is best. That is, as Sartre makes very clear, we legislate for the world in which we wish to live with the affirmation and negations entailed in our choices and actions. This is no small matter.
This means that if you work at a soul sucking job but you rationalize it by saying that it gives you the comforts and security of a steady paycheck, you are legislating for, and creating a world in which it is okay for humans to spend the majority of their lives at work that is meaningless -- or worse, contraindicated by their values, interests, or otherwise harmful to the self, others, or the environment. You are choosing comfort and security in life over freedom, and in Hegel's terms, you are choosing and advocating for a "slave" mentality to predominate.
What does it mean to take responsibility in this situation? Existentialism cannot tell us what to do, but it can tell us to examine our choices and actions; and it also tells us that an appreciation of the contradictions of our lives will cause us to feel anxious. Feeling existential angst doesn't mean there is something wrong with us, but it means there is something right in our orientation. Sartre doesn't pull his punches, and it is at this point that you might decide it's okay to "shoot the messenger," as they say.
Recall also that he describes the despair generated by our human situation: we cannot know in advance that our choices are good or right. To take an example from our personal lives, this means that a person that you trust and love may end up betraying your trust and spitting on your devotion. This is so common that it is a wonder any of us ever trust and love one another. Given this, how can we trust ourselves to make good judgements, about a personal matter or otherwise? We cannot, and thus the despair we feel conditions our very existence.
The bottom line is that the world is largely indifferent to your success or failures. There is no one to care except that you care and it’s your life. And by extension, others who care about you care because you care. If you don’t care, no one else will nor can you expect anyone else to care. And that is the rub: it is your life.
Existentialism will either make you feel heavy and distrustful of yourself and others, or it will free you to live your life in the spirit of experimentation and in a mode of authentic self-reflection.
Sartre and Appiah
This essay is also provocative if you bring it into an encounter with Antony Appiah’s essay "But Would That Still Be Me?" They are actually talking about similar things, but they are also on different planets - that is, from the perspective of Sartre, Appiah’s question doesn’t even make sense. Remember that Appiah is looking for an underlying essence, that which perdures across significant personal change. He asks: would it still be me my sex, gender, race, or ethnicity were to change?
But for the existentialist, there is no essence to be sought prior to our living, choosing, and acting in the world. So whatever sex Appiah is assigned at birth, whatever gender he ends up adopting, these are not meaningful except in so far as they are chosen by, and become meaningful for him.
Sartre would probably say to Appiah: there is no essential identity prior to your existence; whatever "sex" (or the other categories) is, it is nothing outside of the world of human relations through which it acquires meaning. No one but us cares about human differences like sex, gender, race, and ethnicity, so these are human facts, not only or even primarily biological facts.
We can also give a critique of Sartre coming from the Appiah piece because Sartre uses “man” in the generalized sense that implies universality, but what if replaced that “man” in Sartre’s essay with “woman,” would it still be the same essay? Probably not, especially as we are not used to reading "woman" as a universal subject. Notice how immediately the assumed universality of Sartre's "man" is put into question as well.
What if we were to bring race and ethnicity in to the account? "Man" is not racially marked in Sartre’s account, so this means that it’s an unmarked man, which is to say an unproblematically “white” man to who Sartre addresses himself. Is this a problem for Sartre and Existentialism? Is this "man" every man, or does it refer to a very particular conception of masculinity that is premised on a "manly man's" will to power articulated as a domination of other men, women, children, animals, and nature?
Sartre and Beauvoir
When Beauvoir asserts that "one is not born but becomes a woman," she is reformulating the existential dictum that existence precedes essence. Contrary to popular belief, woman's being cannot be reduced to a biological essence or a feminine mystique. Her existence is also given meaning by the choices and actions she takes in the world, and it is in this sense that it is women's responsibility to think through women's existence in and through women's experiences - a task hereto undone. But Beauvoir's analysis in The Second Sex does also offer a critique of Sartre's assumption of "man" as the subject of existentialism:
Beauvoir points out that whereas "man" (the concept) carries a positive or neutral charge, the concept of woman is the negation of the concept of man. Where man is rational, woman is emotional; where man is strong, woman is the weaker sex; whereas man is transcendent, woman is defined by immanence. It is this latter comparison that is most problematic for Sartre's explanation of existentialism as a humanism.
Recall that, in the end, Sartre redefines finds the basis for humanism not with a common human nature, but with a common human situation, of man's existence in the Heideggerian sense of a temporal ek-stasis. We have examined Sartre's use of the Aristotelian concept of "essence," but we have yet to fully articulate his use of the Heideggerian conception of "existence," the second term in existentialism's basic tenet (existence precedes essence).
To this end, we will turn to examine "Part Four" of Heidegger's Being and Time in next week's podcast, so tune in next Tuesday March 10 for a continuing discussion!
In this week's podcast episode, we explored Jean-Paul Sartre's gem of an essay, "Existentialism Is A Humanism." In this essay, Sartre answers his critics on the political left and the religious right by explaining how existentialism does not lead to quietism, is optimistic rather than pessimistic, and does not reduce man to a solitary, solipsistic being. He explains the most basic tenet of existentialism: existence precedes essence. Along the way, he explicates the three moods that permeate existence - anguish (or existential angst), abandonment, and despair. In the end, we also took a closer look at his comments on intersubjectivity and man's self-surpassing. Below is a review of the content of this podcast, after which I want to make some further comments on the provocations of Existentialism.
Sartre’s “Existentialism Is A Humanism"
Sartre’s essay "Existentialism Is A Humanism" is based on a lecture that he delivered in Paris in October of 1945, right on the heals of the end of World War II. Much to his chagrin, it has become the most widely read of his works, as it provides readers with a great introduction to Existentialism. In it, we find Sartre answering his critics’ charges that:
Sartre begins his defense by making a distinction between theist and atheist existentialists, saying that some of the confusion about existentialism stems from confusing these. Atheist Existentialism, of which he is a representative, originates from the French reading of Heidegger’s Existential Phenomenology in Being and Time. (Other French readings of Heidegger will emerge, such as with Derrida’s poststructuralist account, or with Levinas’ account of the Other, but more on this in later podcasts and blogposts.) Sartre’s Existentialism takes it’s point of departure from the non-existence of any authority superior to mankind, i.e. God. But all existentialists agree on the basic tenet of existentialism that existence precedes essence. In order to understand the meaning of this, Sartre will need to school us on the artisanal model below.
“Existence Precedes Essence” Leading To Abandonment, Angst, and Despair
What it means for something to exist is normally taken from an artisanal model found in Aristotle’s Physics:
Following Heidegger’s most basic critique of Aristotle, according to which this understanding of being reduces being to things and embodies a technological view of the world in terms of production, Sartre will assert that unlike things produced in the world, there is no pre-given essence or end of man. That there is no God means that man is forlorn, abandoned to himself and his own freedom with no higher authority to justify his actions and choices. This sense of abandonment also leads to anguish (or existential angst) and despair. Below is a gloss of these three “moods” that permeate our human existence:
Despite the negative resonance of these moods, Existentialism is a rather optimistic philosophy. How is that? Because it gives man the power to create meaning for himself, and the permission to create, with others, man’s “nature” as a history of man’s best ideas and achievements. Sartre has also shown how his brand of existentialism does not lead to quietism, but is the greatest of encouragements to take ones’ choices and actions seriously, and to act on the basis of one’s convictions. It is action that defines man’s life, a direct contradiction of the quietist, apathetic person who lets others do what he sees himself as powerless to achieve. But it is the last charge that is most difficult to answer:
Intersubjectivity, and Sartre's Rejection of the Cartesian Cogito
The last charge against Existentialism is the most serious, and it proceeds from an unnamed kind of critic - that is, from other philosophers. That charge, you will recall, is that Existentialism takes man in isolation, that it is a “subjectivism.” Sartre answers this charge by pointing out that the subject taken up by existentialism is not the solipsistic, Cartesian subject, but the Hegelian subject that embodies within it’s own perspective a recognition of the Other, and the world that comes along with this recognition. Near the end of the essay, he writes:
Man’s subjectivity is one that includes within it the recognition of the Other, and through the other of an external world. Moreover, for the existentialist subject the problematic that frames his human existence is not Descartes’ question of “what can I know with certainty" (or, epistemology), but that of how action in the world defines my existence, and by extension, that of human kind.
Man' s Self-Surpassing
At this point, you may ask yourself: Has Sartre answered the question implied in the title of his essay: How is Exitentialism (or how could it be considered) a humanism. And this is where, I believe, things get a little scandalous. We find Sartre redefining the very meaning of humanism out from under the humanists themselves:
“But there is another sense of the word [humanism], of which the fundamental meaning is this: Man is all the time outside of himself: it is in projecting and losing himself beyond himself that he makes man to exist; and, on the other hand, it is by pursuing transcendent aims that he himself is able to exist. Since man is thus self-surpassing, and can grasp objects only in relation to his self-surpassing, he is himself the heart and center of his transcendence. There is no other universe except the human universe, the universe of human subjectivity. This relation of transcendence as constitutive of man (not in the sense that God is transcendent, but in the sense of self-surpassing) with subjectivity (in such a sense that man is not shut up in himself but forever present in a human universe) – it is this that we call existential humanism. This is humanism, because we remind man that there is no legislator but himself; that he himself, thus abandoned, must decide for himself; also because we show that it is not by turning back upon himself, but always by seeking, beyond himself, an aim which is one of liberation or of some particular realisation (sic), that man can realize himself as truly human.”
According to traditional humanism, underneath all of our differences there lies a shared human “nature” that allows us to uphold common values and ideals. You don’t need God to tell you not to kill other men, if you can put yourself in another’s shoes and realize that you yourself value your life and would not wish to be killed. Human rights are based on just such a secular understanding of humanism.
But the other sense of humanism to which Sartre points here is arguably a much more radical view, and that is the idea of a shared human condition or situation. This situation is what Heidegger describes as being thrown in the world, what he describes as the ex-tasis and temporality of Being. But in order to understand this, we must turn to Being and Time.
Tune in on March 10th, 2015 for the first part of thinkPhilosophy podcast episode on Hediegger's Being and Time. Next week, on March 3rd, we'll expand this discussion with as session on "The Provocations of Existentialism."
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